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THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ROLE IN
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
JOHN W. SUTHERSt

Thank you for the invitation to join you and participate in this law
review Symposium on a very timely topic. While I have no scientific
expertise whatsoever on the subject of global climate change, as a state
attorney general I do have some knowledge about the legal efforts of
various state AGs to deter global warming. So I will discuss that and,
perhaps in doing so, inject a point of view into the Symposium that will
be sufficiently controversial to spice things up a little bit.
You should know that, while I take pride in the fact that I can and
do work effectively with both sides of the political aisle and that I believe I have been successful conducting the work of the Colorado Attorney General's Office on the basis of what the law requires as opposed to
what politics suggests, I am, nevertheless, a pretty conservative Republican. I am a big fan of capitalism and market economics. Given my philosophical bent, it may not surprise you that I have not seen the Al Gore
movie, "An Inconvenient Truth" and that I do not presently subscribe to
the "sky is falling" school of thought when it comes to global warming.
But while I do not personally keep a carbon score card and purchase carbon credits, I do accept as fact that the earth has experienced a discernable warming over the last several decades. Whether it is due to increased human-generated greenhouse gas emissions or is a cyclical event
of the sort the earth has previously experienced, I suspect I am less certain about than most of the rest of you here today. But I am convinced
that the emission of large amounts of carbon dioxide and other pollutants
into the atmosphere is not a good thing for the environment and, therefore, I am wholly supportive of efforts by public policy makers to curb
such pollution. And, to the extent greenhouse gases are causing global
warming, we should do something about it.
So that leads me to the essence of my remarks this afternoon. What
should be the proper role of state attorneys general in regard to global
climate change? I will first give you my answer to that question, and
then elaborate on my response. I believe the proper role of state attorneys general in combating global warming is to enforce the civil and
criminal laws passed by their respective state legislatures to protect environmental quality, to cooperate in the enforcement of federal laws designed to combat the problem, to contest federal positions that are cont
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trary to states' rights and principles of federalism, and to properly represent the state health and environment agencies that are clients of the state
attorney general.
Now as self-evident as that may sound, I would suggest to you that
my view of the proper role of state AGs in this effort would be regarded
with some disdain by a few of my AG colleagues, and certainly so
among many environmental groups in this country who believe that state
AGs have the very broad authority and responsibility to act in whatever
the AGs believe is the broader public interest, whether or not they are
statutorily vested with the authority to do so. You see, as to the state
attorneys general, the global warming debate is a microcosm of a much
larger debate about the proper role of state attorneys general. Let me
frame the debate for you by alluding to my own experience.
When I was sworn in as attorney general of Colorado in January of
2005, I understood my role would be significantly different than my
work as a district attorney or as United States Attorney. Those public
offices did virtually nothing but litigation. The district attorney's office
prosecuted criminal cases and had limited civil jurisdiction in consumer
protection and public health areas. As U.S. Attorney, my office did all
the criminal and civil litigation for the United States in the District of
Colorado. As attorney general, I understood I would be legal advisor to
all departments, agencies, boards, and commissions in Colorado State
government. My office would issue legal opinions, both formal and informal, on a wide variety of subjects pertinent to the operation of the
State. I also understood I would be involved in a broad range of civil
litigation on behalf of the State of Colorado, both as plaintiff and defendant, in addition to the criminal prosecution responsibilities I had had.
But as to my role as the protector of the broad public interest, primarily in regard to Colorado's civil and criminal statutes relating to consumer protection and environmental protection, I still saw myself as assuming the familiar role of a law enforcer. In fact, I would be the chief
law enforcement officer in Colorado. It would be my job to enforce
criminal and civil laws passed by the state legislature to protect consumers from fraud and deception and to enforce a variety of statutes enacted
to protect the public from air and water pollution and other health hazards.
And I do not believe I was naive. I was well aware that state attorneys general had been involved in some controversial litigation, including the massive civil suit against tobacco companies that had culminated
in a settlement agreement in 1999 involving as much as $240 billion,1
1.
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, MASTER SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/ 1109185724

1032468605_cigmsa.pdf.
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and that many free market conservatives questioned whether that was a
proper exercise of the State police power.2 I knew that several attorneys
general, like Eliot Spitzer of New York, had made quite a name for
themselves taking on corporate America, and that many on Wall Street
and elsewhere thought they were overreaching. No, I was not naive, but
neither was I fully prepared for what I found when I joined the ranks of
state attorneys general.
In March of 2005 I attended my first meeting of the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) in Washington, D.C. In the weeks
prior to the meeting I was flooded with invitations to go to elegant private dinners and social receptions hosted by law firms for various interest groups while I was in Washington. That is not something that occurred when I went to district attorney or U.S. Attorney meetings. I was
also invited to a meeting of the Republic Attorneys General Association
(RAGA), which would take place the day before the NAAG meeting. I
was informed that the Democrat attorneys general would be attending a
meeting of DAGA, the Democrat Attorneys General Association. I
learned that many companies and interest groups contributed to both
RAGA and DAGA. I recall being a bit perplexed. What was the propriety and necessity of such an effort to influence attorneys general?
When I came into the room for my first NAAG meeting, the scene
looked very much like what I experienced at National District Attorneys
Association meetings and at meetings where all the U.S. Attorneys got
together. Tables were assembled to create a rectangle and a name card
and a Colorado State flag marked the place I was to sit. But when the
NAAG president called the meeting to order, I noticed that, in addition to
the attorneys general sitting around the table, there were about 150 people sitting at tables in the rear of the room. I whispered to a colleague
sitting adjacent to me. "Who are all the people in the back?" I asked.
He glanced at me in a way to suggest it was a dumb question and then
smiled. "They're here to lobby you," he said.
And indeed they were. I found that the attorneys general are subject
to intense lobbying in much the same fashion as legislators. But instead
of seeking your vote, the lobbyists are hoping that you will or will not
sign on to amicus curiae briefs in the appellate courts, or more importantly, that they can convince you to refrain from initiating or joining a
lawsuit against their company or their interests. In rare instances, an
attorney general will be encouraged to join a litigation that is regarded as
helping the lobbyist's client. Lobbyists spend a great deal of time and
money educating attorneys general about various issues that may become
fodder for litigation in the future. Interest groups are now investing mil2. Michael DeBow, Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing Government Lawsuit
Abuse, POLICY ANALYSIS, May 10, 2002, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa437.pdf.
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lions of dollars in attorney general races in the various states in an attempt to protect their interests.
How did it come to this? Fifteen years ago no one cared much
about state attorney general races. There was no RAGA and DAGA.
NAAG meetings were quiet affairs largely free from outside pressures.
A few of my attorney general colleagues who had held office for a long
time lived through the transition and probably have a better perspective
than mine. But from what I have been able to ascertain and personally
observe, the current situation is a confluence of interrelated trends. The
bottom line is that state attorneys general have become more litigious,
more high profile, and more politically ambitious. Precisely in which
order these occurred or which trend led to others, I am not certain. But I
do know that the current situation coincides with a phenomenon knowledgeable observers refer to as attorney general "activism."
Now what exactly is attorney general activism? Is it capable of
definition or is it simply a case of "you know it when you see it"? Let
me give you a few "I knew it when I saw it" examples and then try to
define it.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, gas prices rose
sharply. The public was angry, perceiving that the rise in price was more
the result of corporate opportunism than market forces. The state AGs,
all wanting to be perceived as diligent problem solvers, weighed in with
their concerns. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and several AGs
initiated investigations. 3 Colorado had initiated gas pricing investigations in approximately eight out of the previous dozen years. 4 I distinctly
recall a nationwide phone conference in which the FTC gave the AGs a
preview of the report they were issuing the next day. Essentially, the
FTC found no systematic wrongdoing. 5 It concluded that the rise in
prices was attributable to market forces, including the highly volatile
spot and futures markets.6 Various AG investigations reported similar

3.
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INVESTIGATION OF GASOLINE PRICE MANIPULATION AND
POST-KATRINA GASOLINE PRICE INCREASES (2006), available at http://www.fte.gov/reports/
060518PublicGasolinePricesInvestigationReportFinal.pdf; see, e.g., CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT
CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION, STATE OF IDAHO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON
POST-HURRICANE KATRINA GASOLINE PRICES IN IDAHO, available at http://www2.state.id.us/
ag/newsrel/2006/GasReport2006.pdf, CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL LOCKYEAR,
REPORT ON GASOLINE PRICING IN CALIFORNIA, UPDATE MARCH 2004, available at
http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust/gasoline/pdf/gasoline.pdf; STATEMENT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS
ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN, RISE IN GAS PRICES INVESTIGATED IN WAKE OF HURRICANE
KATRINA,
info.

available at http://www.illinoisattomeygeneral.gov/consumers/gasjprices.html#more_

4.
See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL SALAZAR ANNOUNCES RESULTS OF YEAR-LONG GAS
JUNCTION
AREA
(2000),
available at
PRICE FIXING
INVESTIGATION
IN
GRAND

http://www.ago.state.co.us/press-detail.cfin?pressfD=536.
5.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 3, at viii.
6. Id.
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conclusions. 7 I thought that would be the end of the matter and expected
the phone call to wrap up quickly. But a veteran attorney general from
the Midwest interjected and made what I considered an amazing assertion. In fact, I had to write it down. "Just because we haven't found
anything illegal, doesn't make it right and doesn't mean we shouldn't do
anything about it," he said. "We need to do something about these obscene profits."
Folks, that is the mindset of an activist AG. Luckily, market forces
shifted a short time later and attorney general interest in the issue declined at the same rate as gas prices.
As to AG activism on the issue of global warming, let me cite you
to two cases. In 2006, shortly before he left office, California Attorney
General Bill Lockyer filed suit against the world's six largest car makers. 8 In this suit California sought to recover damages for all environmental damage caused by automobiles since their invention. 9 In California v. GeneralMotors Corp., it was California's contention that cars are
a "public nuisance" the manufacturers inflicted upon it.'0 The suit ignored the fact that the California legislature long ago passed the nation's
strictest auto emission standards and that the companies had specially
equipped a significant portion of their fleet in order to comply with those
standards. The suit also did not deal with the reality that California constructed an enormous highway system to accommodate this alleged public nuisance. The suit was eventually dismissed by the federal district
court in the fall of 2007 on the grounds it raised political questions outside the jurisdiction of the courts."1 Folks, I believe this was a case of
AG activism.
Several Eastern attorneys general, including Eliot Spitzer and his
successor Andrew Cuomo, do not like coal fired power plants. So
Spitzer, Richard Blumenthal in Connecticut, and several fellow state
AGs sued the nation's five largest coal burning utilities, even though
none of the utilities were located in their states.' 2 In Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., Inc. the AGs sought a reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions. 13 The AGs viewed these emissions as a public nuisance and claimed they needed to bring the case because the federal government and coal burning utility companies had failed to implement any
7.
See CONSUMER PROTECTION UNIT CIVIL LITIGATION DIVISION, supra note 3, at 50-51;
CALIFORNIA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL BILL LOCKYEAR, supra note 3, at 2-3; STATEMENT FROM
THE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL LISA MADIGAN, supra note 3, at paras. 2-3.

8.
Complaint, California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007) (No. C06-05755 MJJ).
9.
Id. at *2.
10.
Id.
California v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
11.
Sept. 17, 2007).
12.
See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
13.
Id. at 260.
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meaningful measures to address this matter of national and worldwide
significance.' 4 The U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New
York dismissed the action as raising non-justiciable political questions.15
Ladies and gentlemen, therein lies the rub. Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not believe that state AGs have the authority to act in whatever they believe is the broader national or international interest and to
usurp the jurisdictional authority of Congress and federal regulatory
agencies in the process. I believe many of these are in fact political or
policy questions to be resolved by legislative bodies.
I also believe basic principles of federalism are being undermined.
Over the last year, Andrew Cuomo, Eliot Spitzer's successor as Attorney
General of New York, has taken creative legal steps in an attempt to deter new coal fired utility plants in Kansas and Colorado. To me, the notion that the attorney general of New York has the jurisdictional authority to attempt to block utility plants in Kansas and Colorado is an affront
to the most basic tenets of federalism. If the attorneys general of a few
Eastern states want to control carbon emissions in Colorado and Kansas,
they need to lobby the legislators and regulators in those states and/or
fight and win battles in Congress that will result in national air quality
standards applicable to every state. Otherwise, they should leave it to the
people of Colorado to regulate their own utilities. And incidentally, the
new coal fired utility unit in Colorado had been approved as part of an
agreement between industry and environmentalists because two older
coal units would also be retrofitted as part of the deal and the three of
them together would have less total emissions than the two currently
operational units.
My definition of AG activism is this: It is when a state attorney
general attempts to remedy a real or perceived problem through means
other than that intended by those elected to make public policy. My test
in determining whether to exercise state power to sue someone is simply
this: Has a law been violated and is there sufficient evidence to prove it
in court? I will not bring a legal action to stop conduct if a legislature
has not provided me a means to do so either by express statutory authority or by statutory recognition that I retain certain common law powers.
Now, do I lobby the legislature if I believe they should change the
law and give me broader jurisdiction? You bet I do. Do I join multistate actions? You bet I do, if I believe the defendant has violated Colorado law. For example, we recently caught pharmaceutical companies
whose patents on certain products were about to expire paying off potential generic competitors to stay out of the market. That is a violation of
the anti-trust laws of Colorado and a multi-state action is a very efficient
14.
15.

Id. at 271.
Id. at 274.
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and effective means to resolve it. In fact, culpable corporate defendants
often view this as the preferred method for resolution of such issues.
The aggressive litigation posture taken by some of my fellow state
attorneys general has led critics to question whether they are engaged in
a violation of the separation of powers. By using perceived common law
powers to achieve public policy objectives they deem desirable, they are,
in essence, legislating and regulating by litigation. They are shaping
public policy, traditionally the legislative function. But the consent decrees by which they resolve the litigation and secure policy changes are
not subject to either legislative or executive approval.
The aggressive litigation pursued by the state AGs has caused them
to assume a much higher public profile. Mainstream media have generally reported the attorney general activism favorably and many attorneys
general have assumed a populist image that plays very well with voters.
State attorneys general are now routinely running for higher office. That
in turn has, in my opinion, attracted more lawyers who have primarily a
political background rather than a legal background, to run for the office.
It is very common now for successful state legislators to run for attorney
general. They may or may not have extensive legal backgrounds in
prosecution or in the private sector. Not surprisingly, in many of the
meetings I have been in with fellow attorneys general that included discussions of actual or potential litigation or expressions of frustration
about social or economic problems facing the country, some of my brethren sound a lot more like policy-making legislators than law-enforcing
prosecutors.
So the bottom line is this: When it comes to commencing litigation,
whether environmental or otherwise, I still believe my only appropriate
consideration should be whether Colorado law has been violated or
whether federal law gives me jurisdiction to pursue prescribed remedies.
I believe attorneys general should seek to solve problems only through
remedies provided by the Constitution and by the legislature of their respective state or by Congress. That can include common law remedies
the legislature recognizes within the attorney general's jurisdiction. I do
not believe it is appropriate for attorneys general to pursue consumer
protection or environmental litigation that does not derive from constitutional or legislative authority, but rather represents the attorney general's
personal view of what constitutes the broad public interest. By the way,
in utilizing available state and federal legislative remedies, including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 16 my office is engaged in a significant amount of environmental
litigation to protect air and water quality in Colorado.

16.

See 42 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
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And to emphasize that these jurisdictional issues are not simple
ones, I will tell you that my office is willing, if directed by our clients in
the executive branch, to join California, New York and other states in
suing the federal government to preserve the right of states to set emission standards for cars purchased and driven in their state. Regardless of
my personal views as to the wisdom of doing so, I believe that is a proper
exercise of state power. I also acknowledge that it was the right of several states to sue the Environmental Protection Agency and challenge its
determination that it lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate
carbon dioxide as a pollutant.' 7 That was a question that needed to be
answered and I saw the suit as an acknowledgement that this is a problem that needs a national and international solution.
Ironically, I believe some of my more activist colleagues are facing
the prospect of losing some front page exposure. I am pleased that it
appears the federal government is becoming more engaged in the global
warming debate and what to do about it. If there is a coherent national
policy on the issue, it is my hope that my state brethren will be less
tempted to run roughshod over the basic framework of federalism. But
then again, I would not be surprised to see the Attorney General of California or the Attorney General of New York up the ante in the near future
and bring a suit against China and India. After all, why should international boundaries stand in the way of what they believe is good for the
citizens of California or New York? When you want to be governor,
senator, or perhaps President, sometimes your ambition knows no
boundaries.

17.

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).

